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Abstract 
 This special issue explores the growing intersection between mathematical psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience. Mathematical psychology, and cognitive modeling more generally, 
has a rich history of formalizing and testing hypotheses about cognitive mechanisms within a 
mathematical and computational language, making exquisite predictions of how people perceive, 
learn, remember, and decide. Cognitive neuroscience aims to identify neural mechanisms 
associated with key aspects of cognition using techniques like neurophysiology, 
electrophysiology, and structural and functional brain imaging. These two come together in a 
powerful new approach called model-based cognitive neuroscience, which can both inform 
cognitive modeling and help to interpret neural measures. Cognitive models decompose complex 
behavior into representations and processes and these latent model states can be used to explain 
the modulation of brain states under different experimental conditions. Reciprocally, neural 
measures provide data that help constrain cognitive models and adjudicate between competing 
cognitive models that make similar predictions about behavior. As examples, brain measures are 
related to cognitive model parameters fitted to individual participant data, measures of brain 
dynamics are related to measures of model dynamics, model parameters are constrained by 
neural measures, model parameters or model states are used in statistical analyses of neural data, 
or neural and behavioral data are analyzed jointly within a hierarchical modeling framework. We 
provide an introduction to the field of model-based cognitive neuroscience and to the articles 
contained within this special issue. 
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 Exciting new synergies between mathematical psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
have emerged. This special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Psychology includes reviews, 
tutorials, and original research papers highlighting this new area of model-based cognitive 
neuroscience. In this opening article, we outline this new approach and introduce the articles 
contained in this special issue. 
 
What is Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience? 
 Alternative approaches to theory in both psychology and neuroscience often begin by 
considering Marr’s (1982) classic three levels: The computational level considers the goals of the 
organism and the structure of the environment, without considering mechanism, typified by 
many Bayesian theories of the mind (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). The algorithmic level considers what 
representations and processes underlie cognition and perception, without considering their 
biological realization, typified by many mathematical and computational models of cognition 
and perception (e.g., Busemeyer, Townsend, Wang, & Eidels, in press; Sun, 2008). The 
implementation level asks how mechanisms are physically realized within a biological substrate, 
namely neurons and their connections in the brain, typified by classical theoretical work in 
neuroscience (e.g., Carnevale & Hines, 2006; Dayan & Abbott, 2005).  
 While Marr envisioned connections between these levels, there often had been 
intellectual and disciplinary barriers to considering explanations that crossed levels. This led 
theorists to work traditionally within only one level of analysis. Not so long ago, a graduate 
student trained in mathematical psychology considering postdoctoral training in neuroscience 
might have been about as sensible as considering running off to join the circus. For some, the 
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brain could well be made of tinker toys for its relevance to understanding human cognition. As 
well, not so long ago, few trained in systems neuroscience would ever consider whether insights 
from cognitive and mathematical psychology might inform understanding of neural function. 
Cognitive conceptual building blocks were often thought little more than folk psychology, with 
philosophical arguments lending support to a strict reductionist approach to understanding the 
brain (e.g., Churchland, 1986).1  
 Early attempts to address this impasse focused on connectionist models of cognition that 
took inspiration from the brain. Connectionists viewed the brain as consisting of simple 
computing units (akin to neurons) that integrated signals passed across connection weights that 
were adjusted by learning rules. However, these models rarely made contact with the 
implementational details of the brain. In most cases these models served as existence proofs that 
a model consisting of many simple computing elements could accomplish a task in roughly the 
same fashion as a human. Nevertheless, these models were attempts to bridge levels of analysis 
and were championed as more biologically plausible than competing models at the algorithmic 
or computational levels. Unfortunately, notions of biological plausibility were rarely defined nor 
evaluated rigorously. The gap between levels of analyses stubbornly remained. 
 Model-based cognitive neuroscience breaks the traditional barriers between models and 
the brain (e.g., Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Eichele, Brown, & Serences, 2011; Forstmann & 
Wagenmakers, 2015; Palmeri, Schall, & Logan, 2015; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). From the 
perspective of cognitive and mathematical psychology, formal models explain behavior in terms 
of representations and processes instantiated in mathematics and computations, and observed 
variation in behavior across experimental conditions and individuals is explained in terms of 
variation in model parameters and model states. Model-based cognitive neuroscience allows for 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   5	  
consideration of whether these latent model parameters or model states might be related to, or 
constrained by, observed brain measures or brain states, over and above whether a model fits or 
predicts observed behavior. From the perspective of systems and cognitive neuroscience, a key 
component of understanding neurons, neural circuits, or brain areas is explaining the 
computations that they perform. In a model-based cognitive neuroscience approach, to the extent 
that brain measures or brain states are predicted by model parameters or model states, those 
models provide a potential explanation of brain function, regardless of whether or not those 
models are implemented in neuron-like elements. 
 The emergence and growth of model-based cognitive neuroscience over the past decade 
can be attributed to a number of converging forces. One was the recognition on the part of 
cognitive modelers and mathematical psychologists interested in understanding the mechanisms 
that brain data is simply additional data by which to constrain and contrast models. Response 
probabilities, response times, confidence ratings and the like are the outcomes of processing. 
Brain data reflect intermediary states. Considering how internal processes predicted by a model 
relate to internal processes measured in the brain can break theoretical stalemates caused by 
model mimicry. While two different models making different mechanistic assumptions about 
representations and processes may make similar predictions about observed behavior, they may 
well make different predictions about internal model states, which can then be compared with or 
constrained by measured brain states (e.g., Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Mack, 
Preston, & Love, 2013; Purcell, Heitz, Cohen, Schall, Logan, & Palmeri, 2010; Purcell, Schall, 
Logan, & Palmeri, 2012).  
 Another force was the recognition on the part of cognitive and systems neuroscientists for 
the need for new approaches to making sense of the growing body of neural data from functional 
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brain imaging, electrophysiology, neurophysiology, and other neuroscience techniques. 
Correlating brain measures with stimuli, conditions, and responses provides only a rather limited 
window on understanding brain function. To go beyond merely mapping out which brain areas 
or which neurons modulate their activity under which conditions means to explain and 
understand what mechanisms and computations are engaged within those brain areas or neurons. 
Algorithmic and computational models provide a language and a body of viable hypotheses, as 
well as a set of tools, for explaining and understanding those neural mechanisms and 
computations.  
 Recognition has grown for considering the algorithms and computations that underlie 
neural processing. Carandini (2012) characterized any direct link between neural circuits and 
behavior as a “bridge too far”, and argued that it was necessary to theorize at an intermediate 
level in Marr’s hierarchy, considering the algorithms and computations that neural circuits 
perform. The purely bottom-up approach to understanding the brain that characterized the initial 
stages of the billion Euro Human Brain Project was widely criticized by cognitive and 
computational neuroscientists and led to a shake-up of its leadership and vision (e.g., Enserink & 
Kupferschmidt, 2014; Theil, 2015). Rather than adopting a strictly bottom-up (or top-down) 
approach, model-based cognitive neuroscience can be characterized as an inside-out approach 
(Love, 2015), that may well be a level of theorizing that is just right (Logan, Schall, & Palmeri, 
2015). 
 Perhaps the most potent force propelling model-based cognitive neuroscience over the 
past decade has been its demonstrated success in providing new insight at both the cognitive and 
neural levels. One especially salient body of work has centered around accumulator models of 
decision making, a well-known class of models with a long history in cognitive psychology (e.g., 
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Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). These models assume that variability in choice probability and response 
times arise from variability in the, often noisy, accumulation of evidence to response thresholds, 
and variants of these models have accounted for decisions in perception, memory, categorization, 
and other tasks (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 
2006; Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997). 
As one of the first examples of systems neuroscience making contact with cognitive modeling, 
when Hanes and Schall (1996) were interested in understanding how neurons in Frontal Eye 
Field (FEF) decide where and when to saccade in the visual field, they turned to the cognitive 
modeling literature for inspiration and insight. Based on the fact that the dynamics of certain FEF 
neurons mirrored the dynamics in accumulators, accumulation of evidence models provided a 
language for describing the computations that these FEF neurons were engaged in. Cognitive 
models provided insight into neural processes. Hanes and Schall also showed that the dynamics 
of these FEF neurons were more consistent with variable accumulation to a fixed threshold than 
fixed accumulation to a variable threshold, two competing mechanistic hypotheses of decision 
making that can be difficult to distinguish based on behavioral data alone (Grice, 1968). Neural 
data provided insight into cognitive models. 
 These initial insights spawned a considerable body of research linking neurophysiology 
and cognitive modeling to understand elementary decision making (e.g., Forstmann, Ratcliff, 
Wagenmakers, 2016; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015; 
Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, Shadlen, 2003; Palmeri, Schall, & Logan, 2015; Ratcliff, Cherian, 
& Segraves, 2003; Schall, 2001, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Zandbelt, Purcell, Palmeri, 
Logan, & Schall, 2014). As one illustrative example, Purcell (Purcell et al. 2010, 2012) applied 
accumulator models to understand existing data on the behavior and neurophysiology of saccade 
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decision making by awake behaving primates (e.g., Bichot & Schall, 1999; Cohen, Heitz, 
Woodman, & Schall, 2009). Adopting a classic approach used in mathematical psychology, they 
formulated a variety of alternative models assuming various architectural components 
characteristic of various accumulator models of decision making, rejecting models that could not 
account qualitatively and quantitatively for observed response probabilities and distribution of 
response times for saccades.  
 Going beyond a pure mathematical psychology approach of fitting models to behavioral 
data, they turned to neurophysiology in two ways. First, they allowed neurophysiology to 
constrain key model components. In many, but not all (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 
1997), applications of accumulator models, the rate at which evidence is accumulated, the drift 
rate, is allowed to be a free parameter. Purcell et al. (2010, 2012) instead instantiated an 
hypothesis that a particular class of neurons in FEF (visually-responsive neurons) represent the 
evidence that is accumulated, replacing the drift rate and other parameters with recorded 
neurophysiology. Neurophysiology significantly limited the flexibility of various model 
architectures to account for observed behavioral data.  
 Second, faced with several alternative model architectures that could account equally 
well for the observed behavioral data, if they had no other data to turn to, they would have had to 
appeal parsimony in selecting a winning model architecture (see also Boucher et al., 2007; Logan 
et al., 2015). Purcell et al. (2010, 2012) instead turned to neurophysiology as an additional data 
source for contrasting between alternative models. Adopting the linking proposition (Schall, 
2004; Teller, 1984) that movement-related neurons in FEF instantiate an accumulation of 
evidence to a threshold for saccade decisions (Hanes & Schall, 1996), they compared the 
predicted dynamics of model accumulation to the observed dynamics of these FEF neurons (see 
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also Purcell & Palmeri, this volume). Only their gated accumulator model could both account for 
the behavioral data and predict the dynamics of FEF movement-related neurons. 
Neurophysiology provided key data by which to contrast models that otherwise provided the 
same predictions of overt behavior.  
 Another approach for avoiding the theoretical stalemate that can ensue when fitting 
complex models to behavioral data alone is to treat neural data as auxiliary information on which 
latent model mechanisms should covary. Models like the classic diffusion model (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) have three sources of trial-to-trial variability, assuming 
fluctuations in things like response bias, the rate of evidence accumulation, and perceptual and 
motor non-decision time. The assumption is that these parameters vary from one trial to another 
in ways that are completely consistent throughout the experiment (an assumption known as 
independent, identically distributed). However, because there is no mechanism to guide these 
fluctuations, we cannot appreciate aspects of the decision process that are vital to ensuring 
success on a specific trial. Furthermore, these assumptions are at odds with several findings in 
neuroscience that implicate the gradual waxing and waning of attention on behavioral 
performance. In summary of these findings, unique networks of brain activity arise from 
separating neural data on the basis of behavioral data: an “off-task” network gives rise to poor 
behavioral performance whereas an “on-task” network gives rise to good behavioral performance 
(Mittner, Boekel, Tucker, Turner, Heathcote, & Forstmann, 2014; Turner et al., 2015).  
 These observations lead Turner, Van Maanen, and Forstmann (2015) to develop a model 
that blends neuroscience and mathematical psychology to formally ground decision-making 
models with neurophysiology. Their strategy was to treat trial-by-trial neural data (as measured 
by fMRI) as information about the trial-to-trial fluctuations in the latent parameters assumed by a 
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standard diffusion model. The model was constructed on the basis of a previously developed 
framework for imposing neurophysiological constraints on behavioral models across subjects 
(Turner, Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Brown, Sederberg, & Steyvers, 2013, Turner, 2015), but 
extends this framework to a trial-by-trial basis. Once fit to data, the model was able to articulate 
how disparate networks of brain activity were associated with orthogonal mechanisms in the 
model, such as pre-stimulus bias and the rate of evidence accumulation. Turner et al. also 
showed that not only did their model provide a new perspective on both neural and behavioral 
data using generative modeling techniques, but the model could also outperform a standard 
diffusion model that only considered behavioral data in a leave-one-out cross-validation test.  
 Model-based neuroscience opens up possibilities for cognitive models to take on second 
lives as formal neuroscientific theories. For example, Love and Gureckis (2007) proposed a 
theory linking aspects of the SUSTAIN clustering model of human categorization (Love, Medin, 
& Gureckis, 2004; Sakamoto & Love, 2004) to the functions of prefrontal cortex and the 
hippocampus. They simulating various populations, such as amnesics (Love & Gureckis, 2007), 
infants (Gureckis & Love, 2004), and the aged (Davis, Love, Maddox, 2012), by adjusting model 
parameters hypothesized to relate to brain regions whose functions vary across populations. With 
the advent of model-based neuroscience, exact predictions of the theory were tested and 
confirmed with healthy young adults using fMRI (Davis, Love, Preston, 2012a; 2012b; Davis, 
Xue, Love, Preston & Poldrack, 2014; Mack, Preston, & Love, in press). The analyses revealed a 
number of phenomena that would not be possible to observe without the model, such as how the 
involvement of the hippocampus changes over learning trials, ramping up for familiar items 
(related to recognition) at the time of decision and ramping down at the time of feedback as the 
error signal abates (Davis et al., 2012a). The model-based imaging work also confirmed more 
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speculative hypotheses such as that prefrontal and hippocampus interactions would be strongest 
in the early stages of mastering a new learning task as attention weights are established (Mack et 
al., in press). 
 While we opened this article by contrasting a bottom-up neural network approach with an 
inside-out (Love, 2015) cognitive modeling approach to relating brain and behavior, we want to 
make clear that the approaches used in a model-based cognitive neuroscience can just as well be 
applied to neural network models as to more abstract cognitive models. The SUSTAIN model 
(Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) used by Davis, Love, and Preston (2012) discussed above is 
instantiated using a number of neural network building blocks. Yet the relation between 
SUSTAIN and brain imaging data is not cemented by any mapping from neural-like model 
elements to neurons in the brain, but by the ability of patterns of activity in the model to reveal 
and explain patterns of activity in the brain. Similarly, the overall structure of so-called deep 
learning models of vision (e.g., LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015) are inspired by neural networks 
and key aspects of the neurophysiology of the primate visual system. But the insights provided 
by these models into understanding the representation of objects in the brain (Kriegeskorte, 
2015; Yamins, Hong, Cadieu, Solomon, Seibert, & DiCarlo, 2014) is based on how well patterns 
within high-level representational layers of these models predict patterns of brain activity, not on 
the neural-like building blocks of these models (Khaligh-Razavi, Henriksson, Kay, & 
Kriegeskorte, this volume; Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014).  
 
Overview 
Here we provide brief outlines of the papers that appear in this special issue: 
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Approaches to Analysis in Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience. Turner, Forstmann, Love, 
Palmeri, and Van Maanen (this volume) provide an overarching framework for describing the 
varying approaches to model-based cognitive neuroscience that have emerged in the literature 
over the past several years. They organize these approaches on the basis of particular theoretical 
goals, which include using neural data to constrain a cognitive model, using a cognitive model to 
predict neural data, and accounting for both neural and behavioral data simultaneously using the 
same model. Accompanying each of these theoretical goals, they highlight some particularly 
successful examples. They also provide a conceptual guide to choosing among various 
approaches when performing model-based cognitive neuroscience. 
 
Integrating Theoretical Models with Functional Neuroimaging. Pratte and Tong (this volume) 
highlight a number of salient examples linking cognitive models and functional brain imaging 
data using a model-based cognitive neuroscience approach. Their selective review spans a broad 
range of core topics in perception and cognition, including visual perception (Brouwer & 
Heeger, 2011), attention (Pratte, Ling, Swisher, & Tong, 2013), long-term memory (Kragel, 
Morton, & Polyn, 2015), categorization (Mack, Preston, & Love, 2013), and cognitive control 
(Ide, Shenoy, Yu, & Li, 2013). 
 
A Step-by-step Tutorial on Using the Cognitive Architecture ACT-R in Combination with fMRI 
Data. Borst and Anderson (this volume) provide a tutorial on using the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture (e.g., Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998) to understand fMRI data (e.g., 
Anderson, Betts, Ferris, & Fincham, 2010; Anderson, Fincham, Qin, & Stocco, 2008; Borst & 
Anderson, 2013). They illustrate how ACT-R can be used in combination with fMRI data in two 
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different ways: first that fMRI data can be used to evaluate and constrain models in ACT-R by 
means of predefined Region-of-Interest (ROI) analysis, and second that predictions from ACT-R 
models can be used to locate neural correlates of model processes and representations by means 
of model-based fMRI analysis. As a tutorial, they provide code and worked examples of both 
types of analysis on a math problem solving task performed in an fMRI scanner. 
 
Variability in Behavior That Cognitive Models Do Not Explain Can Be Linked to Neuroimaging 
Data. Gluth and Rieskamp (this volume) review evidence for the proposal that neural and 
behavioral variability can be linked to one another by allowing moment-to-moment fluctuations 
in neural measures, like fMRI and EEG, to inform trial-by-trial variability in cognitive model 
parameters. One approach to linking single-trial measures of the brain to single-trial parameters 
in models has been to simply regress them onto one another. Gluth and Rieskamp provide a 
tutorial of a novel and efficient alternative approach that goes beyond a raw two-stage 
correlational approach by increasing the resolution of the single-trial parameter estimates in an 
iterative fashion, similar in some ways to an EM algorithm. As illustration, they show how the 
variability in the parameters of an accumulator (sequential sampling) model can be related to 
variability in neuroimaging data. 
 
How Attention Influences Perceptual Decision Making: Single-trial EEG Correlates of Drift-
Diffusion Model Parameters. Nunez, Vandekerckhove, and Srinivasan (this volume) provide a 
specific illustration of how variability in neural measures can constrain variability in model 
parameters. Within a hierarchical Bayesian framework, various forms of a drift-diffusion model 
are fitted to behavioral data from a perceptual decision making task, with different model forms 
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assuming different mathematical relationships between model parameters and EEG measures. 
Trial-to-trial measures of certain key attention-related evoked potentials in simultaneous EEG 
recordings can explain trial-to-trial evidence accumulation rates and perceptual processing times 
in a diffusion model fitted to perceptual decision making behavior. 
 
 
A Confirmatory Approach for Integrating Neural and Behavioral Data into a Single Model. van 
Ravenzwaaij, Provost, and Brown (this volume) provide another illustration of a joint modeling 
approach to model-based cognitive neuroscience. Within a hierarchical Bayesian framework they 
use the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) model (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) to account for 
behavioral data during a mental rotation task, testing different hypotheses linking cognitive 
model parameters and neural data measured via event-related potentials (ERPs). They 
specifically investigate how changes in drift rate and non-decision time with mental rotation 
angle might be constrained by changes in certain ERP amplitudes measured during the task. 
 
On the Efficiency of Neurally-informed Cognitive Models to Identify Latent Cognitive States. 
Hawkins, Mittner, Forstmann, and Heathcote (this volume) illustrate how neural data can be used 
to test between cognitive models with different latent states. They focus on whether the 
underlying states driving performance in a speeded decision tasks are discrete or continuous. 
Through model recovery studies the authors determine that discrete state models are more 
robustly recovered than continuous state models, suggesting that neural data may more easily be 
linked to certain varieties of cognitive models. 
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Relating Accumulator Model Parameters and Neural Dynamics. Purcell and Palmeri (this 
volume) build on the work cited earlier on the identification of neural activity in certain brain 
areas with evidence accumulation in sequential sampling models. Through simulations, they 
caution against simply equating variability in measures of neural dynamics with variability in 
cognitive model parameters. Simulated variation in model dynamics in accumulators is not 
always related one-to-one with variation of accumulator model parameters. The most general 
mapping between neural measures and model mechanisms may be one between measured neural 
dynamics and predicted model dynamics, not one between measured neural dynamics and model 
parameters. 
 
A Primer on Encoding Models in Sensory Neuroscience. van Gerven (this volume) explores 
fundamental questions of how the primate visual system represents the visual world. In visual 
neuroscience, the concept of the receptive field has been a key concept for understanding the 
response properties of neurons. While classical receptive field mapping has proved successful for 
understanding representations in early visual areas like area V1, more general methods are 
needed for understanding higher-level visual representations and to allow for non-invasive 
mapping of visual representations in humans. van Gerven provides a mathematical and 
computational primer on Encoding Models, which at first approximation can be described as 
generalization of classical receptive field and population receptive field approaches, allowing for 
the nonlinear response properties of complex representations in high-level visual areas and their 
manifestation in functional brain imaging to be well characterized. 
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Fixed Versus Mixed RSA: Explaining Visual Representations by Fixed and Mixed Feature Sets 
from Shallow and Deep Computational Models. Khaligh-Razavk, Henriksson, and Kriegeskorte 
(this volume) provide a complementary approach to understanding how the primate visual 
system represents the world. Their starting point is existing neural network and computer vision 
models of object recognition. Their question is whether the representations produced in the 
model predict the activity measured in the brain. Using a technique called Representational 
Similarity Analysis (Kriegeskorte, 2009, 2015), they ask whether patterns of similarities in 
object representations produced in particular layers of a model are analogous to patterns of 
similarities measured in particular areas of the brain. Deep learning models (LeCun, Bengio, & 
Hinton, 2015) have provided good accounts of object representations observed in high-level 
visual areas (Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014; Kriegeskorte, 2015; Yamins, Hong, Cadieu, 
Solomon, Seibert, & DiCarlo, 2014); this article reviews that work and outlines approaches to 
fixing or mixing the model representations when comparing to brain measures. 
 
A Tutorial on the Free-energy Framework for Modeling Perception and Learning.  
Bogacz (this volume) provides a tutorial on free energy and related predictive coding 
approaches. In these approaches, models assume that the sensory cortex infers the most likely 
values of attributes or features of sensory stimuli from the noisy inputs encoding the stimuli. The 
author demonstrates how powerful inferences can be made by very simple computations that 
could be carried out by neurons. Clear examples help the reader grasp these general concepts that 
link measures of uncertainty with neural computations. 
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Model-based Functional Neuroimaging Using Dynamic Neural Fields: An Integrative Cognitive 
Neuroscience Approach. Wijeakumar, Ambrose, Spencer, and Curtu (this volume) provide a 
review and tutorial of an approach to model-based cognitive neuroscience using a theoretical 
framework called Dynamic Field Theory (Erlhagen & Schöner 2002) applied to functional brain 
imaging (Buss, Wifall, Hazeltine, & Spencer, 2009). They outline the assumptions of DFT and 
how it is applied to behavioral data, describe how parameters of the model can be used in brain 
imaging analyses, and compare the model-based cognitive neuroscience approach to standard 
brain imaging analyses of the same dataset.  
 
Guest Consulting Editors 
 We thank the ad hoc reviewers who contributed critical comments that helped shape the 
papers appearing in this special issue; we especially thank the following for serving as guest 
consulting editors for this special issue: Jelmer Borst (University of Gronigen), Tyler Davis 
(Texas Tech University), Birte Forstmann (University of Amsterdam), Scott Brown (University 
of Newcastle), Sam Gershman (Harvard University), Laurence Hunt (University College 
London), Xiaosi Gu (University of Texas at Dallas), Michael Mack (University of Toronto), 
Neal Morton (University of Texas at Austin), Braden Purcell (New York University), Michael 
Pratte (Mississippi State University), Per Sederberg (The Ohio State University), Mark Steyvers 
(University of California Irvine), Marcel van Gerven (Donders Institute), Marieke van Vugt 
(University of Groningen), Joachim Vandekerckhove (University of California Irvine), Corey 
White (Syracuse University), Bram Zandbelt (Donders Institute). 
 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   18	  
References 
Anderson, J.R. (1990). The Adaptive Character of Thought. Psychology Press. 
Anderson, J.R., Betts, S., Ferris, J.L., & Fincham, J.M. (2010). Neural imaging to track mental 
states. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, 107, 7018-
7023. 
Anderson, J.R., Bothell, D., Lebiere, C., & Matessa, M. (1998). An integrated theory of list 
memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 38, 341-380. 
Anderson, J.R., Fincham, J.M., Qin, Y., & Stocco, A. (2008). A central circuit of the mind. 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 12, 136-143. 
Bichot, N.P., & Schall, J.D. (1999). Effects of similarity and history on neural mechanisms of 
visual selection. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 549-554. 
Bogacz, R. (in press). A tutorial on the free-energy framework for modelling perception and 
learning. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., & Cohen, J.D. (2006). The physics of optimal 
decision making: A formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-
choice tasks. Psychological Review, 113, 700-765. 
Borst, J.P., & Anderson, J.R. (2013). Using model-based functional MRI to locate working 
memory updates and declarative memory retrievals in the fronto-parietal network. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, 110, 1628-1633. 
Borst, J.P., & Anderson, J.R. (in press). A step-by-step tutorial on using the cognitive 
architecture ACT-R in combination with fMRI Data. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   19	  
Boucher, L., Palmeri, T.J., Logan, G.D., & Schall, J.D. (2007). Inhibitory control in mind and 
brain: An interactive race model of countermanding saccades. Psychological Review, 
114, 376-397.  
Brouwer, G.J., & Heeger, D.J. (2011). Cross-orientation suppression in human visual cortex. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 106(5), 2108-2119. 
Brown, S., & Heathcote, A. (2008). The simplest complete model of choice re- action time: 
Linear ballistic accumulation. Cognitive Psychology, 57, 153-178. 
Busemeyer, J.R., Townsend, J.T., Wang, Z.J. & Eidels A. (2013). Mathematical and 
Computational Models of Cognition. Oxford University Press. 
Buss, A.T., Wifall, T., Hazeltine, E., & Spencer, J.P. (2009). Integrating the behavioral and 
neural dynamics of response selection in a dual-task paradigm: A dynamic neural field 
model of Dux et al. (2009). Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26(2), 334-351. 
Carandini, M. (2012). From circuits to behavior: a bridge too far? Nature Neuroscience, 15, 507-
509. 
Carandini, M., & Heeger, D.J. (2012). Normalization as a canonical neural computation. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 13(1), 51-62. 
Carnevale, N.T., & Hines, M.L. (2006). The NEURON Book. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Cohen, J.Y., Heitz, R.P., Woodman, G.F., & Schall, J.D. (2009). Neural basis of the set-size 
effect in frontal eye field: Timing of attention during visual search. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 101, 1699-1704. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   20	  
Davis, T., Love, B.C., & Maddox, W.T. (2012). Age-related Declines in the Fidelity of Newly 
Acquired Category Representations. Learning and Memory, 19, 325-329. 
Davis, T., Love, B.C., & Preston, A.R. (2012).  Learning the exception to the rule: Model-based 
fMRI reveals specialized representations for surprising category members. Cerebral 
Cortex, 22, 260-273. 
Davis, T., Love, B.C., & Preston, A.R. (2012). Striatal and Hippocampal Entropy and 
Recognition Signals in Category Learning: Simultaneous Processes Revealed by Model-
based fMRI. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
38,821-839. 
Davis, T., Xue, G., Love, B.C., Preston, A.R. & Poldrack, R.A. (2014). Global Neural Pattern 
Similarity As A Common Basis For Categorization and Recognition Memory. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 34 (22), 7472-7484. 
Dayan, P., & Abbott, L.F. (2005). Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical 
Modeling of Neural Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Erlhagen, W., & Schöner, G. (2002). Dynamic field theory of movement preparation. 
Psychological Review, 109(3), 545-572. 
Enserink, M., & Kupferschmidt, K. (2014). European neuroscientists revolt against the E.U.'s 
Human Brain Project. Science. 
Forstmann, B.U., Ratcliff, R., & Wagenmakers, E.J. (2016). Sequential sampling models in 
cognitive neuroscience: Advantages, applications, and extensions. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 67, 641-666. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   21	  
Forstmann, B.U., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Eichele, T., Brown, S., & Serences, J.T. (2011). 
Reciprocal relations between cognitive neuroscience and formal cognitive models: 
Opposites attract? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 272– 279. 
Forstmann, B.U., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (Eds.) (2015). An Introduction to Model-Based 
Cognitive Neuroscience. Springer. 
Gluth, S., & Rieskamp, J. (in press). Variability in behavior that cognitive models do not explain 
can be linked to neuroimaging data. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Gold, J.I., & Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 30, 535-574. 
Grice, G.R. (1968). Stimulus intensity and response evocation. Psychological Review, 75(5), 
359-373. 
Gureckis, T. M., & Love, B. C. (2004). Common mechanisms in infant and adult category 
learning. Infancy, 5, 173-198. 
Hanes, D.P., & Schall, J.D. (1996). Neural control of voluntary movement initiation. Science, 
274, 427-430. 
Hawkins, G.E., Mittner, M., Forstmann, B.U., & Heathcote, A. (in press). On the efficiency of 
neurally-informed cognitive models to identify latent cognitive states. Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology. 
Ide, J.S., Shenoy, P., Yu, A.J., Li, C.S. (2013). Bayesian prediction and evaluation in the anterior 
cingulate cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(5), 2039-2047. 
Khaligh-Razavi, S.-M., Henriksson, L., Kay, K., & Kriegeskorte, N. (in press). Fixed versus 
mixed RSA: Explaining visual representations by fixed and mixed feature sets from 
shallow and deep computational models. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   22	  
Khaligh-Razavi, S.-M., & Kriegeskorte, N. (2014). Deep supervised, but not unsupervised, 
models may explain IT cortical representation. PLoS Computational Biology, 10, 
e1003915. 
Kragel, J.E., Morton, N.W., & Polyn, S.M. (2015). Neural activity in the medial temporal lobe 
reveals the fidelity of mental time travel. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(7), 2914-2926. 
Kriegeskorte, N. (2009). Relating population-code representations between man, monkey, and 
computational models. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 3, 363-373 
Kriegeskorte, N. (2015). Deep neural networks: A new framework for modeling biological 
vision and brain information processing. Annual Review of Vision Science, 1, 417-446. 
LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning. Nature, 521(7553), 436-444. 
Logan, G.D., Yamaguchi, M., Schall, G.D., & Palmeri, T.J. (2015). Inhibitory control in mind 
and brain 2.0: A blocked-input model of saccadic countermanding. Psychological 
Review, 122, 115-147. 
Love, B.C. (2015). The algorithmic level is the bridge between computation and brain. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 7(2), 230-242. 
Love, B. C., & Gureckis, T. M. (2007). Models in search of a brain. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 90-108. 
Love, B.C., Medin, D.L., & Gureckis, T.M. (2004). SUSTAIN: A network model of category 
learning. Psychological Review, 111(2), 309-331. 
Lu, Z.L., & Dosher, B.A. (1998). External noise distinguishes attentional mechanisms. Vision 
Research, 38(9), 1183-1198. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   23	  
Mack, M.L., Preston, A.R., Love, B.C. (in press). Dynamic updating of hippocampal object 
representations reflects new conceptual knowledge. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences (PNAS). 
Mack, M.L., Preston, A.R., & Love, B.C. (2013). Decoding the brain’s algorithm for 
categorization from its neural implementation. Current Biology, 23, 2023-2027. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and 
Processing of Visual Information. New York: Freeman. 
Mazurek, M.E., Roitman, J.D., Ditterich, J., Shadlen, M.N. (2003). A role for neural integrators 
in perceptual decision making. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 1257-1269. 
Mittner, M., Boekel, W., Tucker, A.M., Turner, B.M., Heathcote, A., & Forstmann, B.U. (2014). 
When the brain takes a break: A model-based analysis of mind wandering. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 34, 16286-16295. 
Nosofsky, R.M., & Palmeri, T.J. (1997). An exemplar-based random walk model of speeded 
classification. Psychological Review, 104, 266-299. 
Nunez, M.D., Vandekerckhove, J., & Srinivasan, R. (in press). How attention influences 
perceptual decision making: Single-trial EEG correlates of drift-diffusion model 
parameters. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human 
Reasoning. Oxford University Press. 
Palmeri, T.J. (1997). Exemplar similarity and the development of automaticity. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23, 324-354. 
Palmeri, T.J. (2014). An exemplar of model-based cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 18(2), 67-69.  
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   24	  
Palmeri, T.J., Schall, J.D. & Logan, G.D. (2015). Neurocognitive modeling of perceptual 
decision making. In J.R. Busemeyer, J. Townsend, Z.J. Wang, & A. Eidels (Eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Computational and Mathematical Psychology, Oxford University Press. 
Pratte, M.S., Ling, S., Swisher, J.D., & Tong, F. (2013). How attention extracts objects from 
noise. Journal of Neurophysiology, 100(6), 1346-1356. 
Pratte, M.S., & Tong, F. (in press). Integrating theoretical models with functional neuroimaging. 
Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Purcell, B.A., Heitz, R.P., Cohen, J.Y., Schall, J.D., Logan, G.D., & Palmeri, T.J. (2010). 
Neurally-constrained modeling of perceptual decision making. Psychological Review, 
117, 1113-1143.  
Purcell, B.A., & Palmeri, T.J. (in press). Relating accumulator model parameters and neural 
dynamics. Journal of Mathematical Psychology.  
Purcell, B.A., Schall, J.D., Logan, G.D., & Palmeri, T.J. (2012). From salience to saccades: 
Multiple-alternative gated stochastic accumulator model of visual search. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 32(10), 3433-3446.  
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59-108. 
Ratcliff, R., Cherian, A., & Segraves, M. (2003). A comparison of macaque behavior and 
superior colliculus neuronal activity to predictions from models of simple two-choice 
decisions. Journal of Neurophysiology, 90, 1392-1407. 
Ratcliff, R., & Rouder, J.N. (1998). Modeling response times for two-choice decisions. 
Psychological Science, 9, 347-356. 
Ratcliff, R., & Smith, P.L. (2004). A comparison of sequential sampling models for two-choice 
reaction time. Psychological Review, 111, 333-367. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   25	  
Sakamoto, Y., & Love, B. C. (2004). Schematic influences on category learning and recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 534-553. 
Schall, J.D. (2001). Neural basis of deciding, choosing and acting. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 2, 33-42. 
Schall, J.D. (2004). On building a bridge between brain and behavior. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 55, 23-50. 
Smith, P.L., & Ratcliff, R. (2004). Psychology and neurobiology of simple decisions. Trends in 
Neuroscience, 27, 161-168. 
Sun, R. (Ed.). (2008). The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Teller, D.Y. (1984). Linking propositions. Vision Research, 24, 1233-1246. 
Tenenbaum, J.B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T.L., & Goodman, N.D. (2011). How to grow a mind: 
Statistics, structure, and abstraction. Science, 331(6022), 1279-1285. 
Theil, S. (2015). Why the Human Brain Project went wrong – and how to fix it. Scientific 
American, 313. 
Turner, B.M. (2015). Constraining cognitive abstractions through Bayesian modeling. In B.U. 
Forstmann & E.-J. Wagenmakers (Eds.), An Introduction to Model-based Cognitive 
Neuroscience (pp. 199-220). Springer: New York. 
Turner, B.M., Forstmann, B.U., Love, B., Palmeri, T.J., & Van Maanen, L. (in press). 
Approaches to analysis in model-based cognitive neuroscience. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology. 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   26	  
Turner, B.M., Forstmann, B.U., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Brown, S.D., Sederberg, P.B., & Steyvers, 
M. (2013). A Bayesian framework for simultaneously modeling neural and behavioral 
data. NeuroImage, 72, 193-206. 
Turner, B.M., Van Maanen, L., & Forstmann, B.U. (2015). Combining cognitive abstractions 
with neurophysiology: The neural drift diffusion model. Psychological Review, 122, 312-
336. 
van Gerven, M.A.J. (in press). A primer on encoding models in sensory neuroscience. Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology. 
van Ravenzwaaij, D., Provost, A., & Brown, S.D. (in press). A confirmatory approach for 
integrating neural and behavioral data into a single model. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology. 
Wijeakumar, S., Ambrose, J.P., Spencer, J.P., & Curtu, R. (in press). Model-based functional 
neuroimaging using dynamic fields: Probing the neural dynamics of response selection. 
Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
Yamins, D.L., Hong, H., Cadieu, C.F., Solomon, E.A., Seibert, D., & DiCarlo, J.J. (2014). 
Performance-optimized hierarchical models predict neural responses in higher visual 
cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(23), 8619-8624. 
Zandbelt, B.B., Purcell, B.A., Palmeri, T.J., Logan, G.D., Schall, J.D. (2014). Response times 
from ensembles of accumulators. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
111(7), 2848-2853.  
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   27	  
Acknowledgements 
 TJP was supported by NIH R01-EY021833, NSF Temporal Dynamics of Learning 
Center SMA-1041755, and NIH P30-EY08126; BCL was supported by Leverhulme Trust grant 
RPG-2014-075, NIH 1P01-HD080679, and a Wellcome Trust Investigator Award 
WT106931MA. 
 
Palmeri,	  Love,	  &	  Turner	   	   Model-­‐based	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  
	   28	  
Footnotes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Of	  course,	  there	  were	  exceptions	  to	  barriers	  between	  the	  algorithmic	  level	  and	  the	  implementation	  level,	  to	  again	  cast	  this	  in	  Marr’s	  terms.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  relatively	  low-­‐level	  visual	  sensation	  and	  perception,	  there	  have	  long	  been	  deep	  connections	  between	  theoretical	  work	  in	  visual	  psychophysics	  and	  the	  underlying	  visual	  neurophysiology	  and	  neuroanatomy,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  relevant	  neural	  hardware	  is	  not	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  source	  of	  visual	  stimulation.	  And	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  neuropsychology	  has	  long	  considered	  theoretically	  how	  cases	  of	  brain	  damage	  and	  neurodegenerative	  and	  neurodevelopmental	  disorders	  influence	  understanding	  of	  human	  cognition.	  	  	  
